Section II

Operations from 8th to 23rd December, 1941

Japanese landing at Kota Bahru.

170. At  midnight  7th-8th  December,  the weather at Kota Bahru cleared, but the aerodrome surface was extremely boggy owing to heavy rains.  About 0030 hours on the 8th, O.C. Kota Bahru rang up A.H.Q. and stated that three ships had been seen by the beach defences. This  message  was  followed  by another at 0100 hours confirming the presence of these ships, stating that shelling was taking place and that Brigade H.Q. were being asked to  clarify  the  situation. On  this,  A.H.Q. ordered the despatch of a single Hudson with flares to see what was happening.  Before this could be done, at 0115 hours definite information came through from Kota Bahru that landing  on  the  beaches by the Japanese had started from 3-5 ships lying three miles off shore.

Orders issued by A.H.Q.

171. O.C. Kota  Bahru  was  immediately ordered to take offensive action with all available Hudsons, and to order the Vildebeestes at Gong Kedah to deliver a torpedo attack at first light.  It must be remembered that the orders issued to O.C. Kota Bahru as a result of G.H.Q. instructions (para. 144) specifically stated that no offensive action would be taken against the convoy when sighted.  He could not, therefore, initiate the first offensive action of the campaign without further orders.

172. A H Q. also issued orders to Nos.  8 (GR), 27 (NF), 34 (B), 60 (B) and 62 (B) Squadrons to take off at first light and attack shipping in the Kota Bahru area whilst No. 100 (TB) Squadron was ordered to proceed to Kuantan on the following morning and stand by for orders.

173. Norgroup was informed that No. 27 (NF) was also to revert to A.H.Q. control leaving only No. 21 (F) Squadron (R.A.A.F.), for co-operation with IIIrd Corps.

174. The Beaufort at Kota Bahru was instructed to carry out the photographic reconnaissance at first light to Lakon Roads (para. 169)

First Operations against enemy landings at Kota Bahru.

175. At Kota Bahru the first seven Hudson sorties of No. 1 (GR) Squadron R.A.A.F. had taken off to oppose the landing, and by 0300 hours the two available Buffaloes had been despatched against landing barges entering the river which flows into the sea within the frontage  of the beach defences guarding the aerodrome.

176. At 0730 hours on 8th December, the O.C. Kota Bahru gave a resume of the night's operations. 17 Hudson sorties had been carried out, one transport had been destroyed and two others damaged and perhaps sunk.  Landing barges en  route to the beaches had been attacked  and  casualties  had  been inflicted amongst the troops in them.  Intensive A.A. fire had been experienced,  particularly accurate from a cruiser covering the landing. Two Hudsons had been shot down and a third badly damaged, leaving him still six.  One Buffalo had also been hit.  The Vildebeestes from Gong Kedah were in the air.

177. Apparently some 8 transports covered by one cruiser and several destroyers had been involved,  and O.C.  Kota Bahru thought all vessels had now retired to the north. He intended to carry on using the Hudsons for mopping up small craft and beach parties still visible. At 0800 hours, he confirmed that all vessels had retired to the north and that he was mopping  up  the  few  small craft left with bomb and machine-gun fire. He added that there had been some  infiltration  into  the Brigade area.

178. Meanwhile the Vildebeestes of No. 36 (TB) Squadron from Gong Kedah, in heavy rain, found the cruiser, delivered an attack with torpedoes which it evaded and landed at Kota Bahru on their return.

179. Nos. 8 (GR) R.A.A.F., 27 (NF), 34 (B) and 60 (B) Squadrons also arrived on the scene and found little to attack in the area; a signal sent them whilst they were airborne to search further north was not received by all units. One flight of No. 8 (GR) Squadron at least received it but was unable to find the enemy owing to a very heavy rainstorm. Nos. 8 and 60 Squadrons returned to Kuantan, No. 27 to Sungei  Patani, whilst  No.  34 Squadron landed at Butterworth. All squadrons were ordered to refuel and re-arm.

180. No. 62 (B) Squadron which had also been ordered to attack, not finding any target, proceeded north to Patani to bomb transports there. This  squadron (11 Blenheim I's) encountered fighter opposition and fairly intensive A.A. fire.  It carried out its attack from 8,000 ft. but the results obtained were not seen.

First Air Attack on Singapore.

181. Whilst the first landings had been taking place at Kota Bahru, Singapore had its first air-raid shortly after 0400 hours on the 8th December. Radar detected the approaching raid at a distance) of 130-140 miles from Singapore (giving more than 30 minutes warning). Its approach was promulgated from the Fighter Control Operations Room. Unfortunately the staff of this room was unable to obtain any response from the H.Qs. of the Civil A.R.P. organisation, with the result that the civil population received no effective warning, nor was the Civil Air Defence Scheme put into effective action until it was too late. Some 17 aircraft took part in this raid, the majority of the bombs falling at Seletar and Tengah. At the latter place 3 Blenheims of No. 34 (B) Squadron were damaged and the aerodrome was cratered.

Japanese attacks on Northern Airfields.

182. Between 0730 and 0800 hours, Kota Bahru, Gong Kedah and Machang aerodromes were  attacked by bombers and low-flying fighters; except for dummy aircraft, the latter two were unoccupied at the time. These attacks  were  repeated  throughout the day mainly by low-flying fighters, with little effect save in delaying the refuelling and re-armament of aircraft at Kota Bahru.

183. Sungei  Patani,  Penang  and  Butterworth  in N.W.  Malaya were also attacked throughout  8th  December by formations of from 27 to 60 bomber aircraft,  with serious results. The Japanese used light bombs only, directed against aircraft and personnel; they studiously avoided damaging aerodrome surfaces. Personnel on the spot noted that for the next few days Japanese attacks in this area frequently synchronised with aircraft landing or getting ready to take off. This indicated a leakage of  information to the Japanese, but it was never definitely proved that such a leakage actually occurred.

184. There was a particularly serious attack against Alor Star, delivered immediately after No.  62  (B)  Squadron had landed  after  its attack at Patani (para. 180).  The aerodrome was  first  bombed by  27  Japanese  aircraft, which  then  came  down  low  and  machine-gunned aircraft on the ground.  As a result No. 62 (B) Squadron had only two serviceable aircraft left.

185. Nos.  21  (F)  R.A.A.F.  and 27  (NF) Squadrons  at  Sungei  Patani  also  suffered badly and were each reduced to 4 serviceable aircraft; and in consequence of the repeated low attacks on this airfield both squadrons, with their personnel, were withdrawn to Butter-worth.  It was later learnt that the guns in the Buffaloes had given trouble and were all unserviceable from lack of solenoids. The serviceable Blenheim fighters of No. 27 Squadron had carried out periodic patrols over N.W.  Malaya without result. No. 54 (B) Squadron at Butterworth was  also  seriously reduced.

Ground Situation in N.W. Malaya.

186. Aircraft losses from enemy attack thus gravely weakened the air forces available in N.W. Malaya for supporting the army, where the main enemy advance on land was expected to develop. On the 8th there was little enemy air activity against our own ground forces, owing to the enemy's concentration on the bombing of our aerodromes.

187. " Matador " had been cancelled during the morning, and the Army was taking up positions forward of a partially prepared line at  Jitra. Covering  forces  were  advancing north and north-east from Kedah province: one to make contact along the line of advance from the Singora area, the other (Krohkol) to occupy what was known as the Ledge,  an important tactical feature across the Siamese frontier on the Kroh-Patani road, which protected the  communications  of  the force in North Kedah.

The first of these covering forces made contact with the enemy at 2130 hours on the 8th, at Ban Sadao, ten miles inside Siam. The other (Krohcol) reported some opposition from Siamese forces, but continued its advance.

Enemy landings in Singora and Patani area.

188. At 0915 hours on the 8th December the P.R.  Beaufort returned from its reconnaissance of the Lakon Roads  (para.  174). En route,  it had been heavily attacked by fighters and landed in a badly shot up condition, subsequently having to be destroyed. The pilot reported verbally that a large concentration of vessels was landing troops in the Singora-Patani area. His photographs were flown  back to Singapore by the remaining Buffalo fighter.  Shortly afterwards, Norgroup, under orders from IIIrd Corps, despatched 3 Buffaloes of No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. on a tactical reconnaissance to Singora. This reconnaissance confirmed the presence of the main convoy in the Singora area and also revealed a force of about 60 Japanese aircraft, mainly fighters, on Singora aerodrome.

Squadrons driven out of aerodromes in N.E. Malaya on 8th December.

189. It is now necessary to return to the Kota Bahru area. Heavy fighting had been going on on the beaches all day, and reserves had been put in to try and regain the beaches by counter attack.  At 1245 news was received at A.H.Q. of the landing of further troops from one transport covered by a cruiser and several destroyers.  The Station Commander at Kota Bahru had at 1200 hours despatched 4 Hudsons and 3 Vildebeestes to deal with this threat. It  transpired  later  that  the  report  of this further landing was false, but aircraft continued mopping  up  barges  and  machine  gunning beaches.  At 1530 a Hudson from Kota Bahru bombed the railway bridge across the South Golok River west of Kota Bahru, but with doubtful success; the crew, however, observed that the line itself had been partially destroyed already at a point further eastward.

190. Towards 1600 hours reports received at A.H.Q.  indicated that the situation on the ground had become serious.  The Station Commander  reported that  penetration  had been made up to the aerodrome boundary, and that aircraft and personnel had come under sporadic fire. On his representation A.H.Q  approved the evacuation of the aerodrome.   All  aircraft  were  ordered  to Kuantan, personnel and stores to proceed by tram, whilst the denial scheme was to be put inspiration. This was successfully achieved, and 5 Hudsons and 7 Vildebeestes arrived at Kuantan. This withdrawal as far south as Kuantan  was  unavoidable because Gong Kedah, the only aerodrome in the Kota Bahru area that might have been used, was virtually undefended and was in a very exposed situation near the coast.

191. During  the  day,  various  reports  of suspicious vessels off the East coast had been received,  necessitating reconnaissances which, however, were all negative.

Summary of situation on the evening of the 8th December, 1941

192. That  night (8th-9th  December)  the situation was, therefore: —

(a) The Japanese expedition to capture the Kota Bahru aerodrome area was succeeding; and the use of aerodromes in this area was now denied to the R.A.F. Our troops in the area were thus without close air support.

(b) The Japanese main forces were landing unimpeded in the Singora-Patani area, covered by air operations against our aerodromes in N. Malaya  Their advance towards the north-west frontier of Malaya had already begun,  and our forward troops had made contact.  The shipping at Singora had not been attacked,  partly because the aircraft at Kota Bahru were fully engaged locally by the time it was reported, and partly because heavy  Japanese  air  attacks  against  our virtually  undefended  aerodromes in  N.W. Malaya had seriously reduced the squadrons available on them.

(c) The Japanese Air Force was already operating  in  strength  from  Singora  aerodrome.  From the narrow view point of the Royal Air Force, it was apparent that the cancellation of Operation " Matador " was to have a far-reaching influence on air operations in Northern Malaya.

Air  Operations in North  West Malaya—9th December, 1941.

193. In the N W. aerodrome area, enemy air attacks continued, and early on the 9th No. 62 (B) Squadron was forced to withdraw from Alor Star to Butterworth.

194. To counter these attacks, it was decided to  destroy  the  Japanese  fighters  based  on Singora. Two attacks against this aerodrome were planned.  The first was to be made by the aircraft of No. 34 (B) Squadron still located at Tengah, reinforced by No. 60 (B) Squadron, which had by now moved there from Kuantan. No. 34 Squadron was ordered to land at Butter-worth,  re-arm and take part in the second attack.  The second attack was to be made by all  available  aircraft  of  Nos.  34  and  62 Squadrons, from Butterworth.  A.H.Q. issued orders that both attacks were to be escorted by the maximum strength of Buffaloes from No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A A.F.

195. The first attack, consisting of 6 Blenheims of No. 34 (B) Squadron, three of which were  manned  by  crews  of  60  (B) Squadron, was made in the early afternoon of the 9th.   Heavy fighter opposition was encountered, and 3 of our aircraft were shot down.  Results of the attack were not observed, but returning crews claimed that, at least, a congested aerodrome had been hit

196. No fighter escort had been available. No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., had two aircraft serviceable only, which were on tactical reconnaissances for IIIrd Corps. It may be noted here that these aircraft, on the morning of the 9th reported the presence of Japanese light tanks, which were observed at Ban Sadao-moving south.

197. The second attack—a mixed force of Blenheim I's and IV's from Nos. 34 (B) and 62 (B) Squadrons—due off from Butterworth at 1700 hours, was never launched. Just before the  time  of  " take-off,"  Japanese bombers carried out a high bombing attack followed up by machine-gunning aircraft on the ground. One aircraft only of No. 62 (B) Squadron— Captain, Flight Lieutenant A. S. K. Scarf— took off as the attack was developing; the remaining  aircraft  on  the  ground  were  all rendered  unserviceable. Flight Lieutenant Scarf circled the aerodrome until it became apparent that no other aircraft were joining; him. He then proceeded to Singora and pressed home his attack. During his approach to the target and subsequent get-away, A.A. fire and heavy fighter opposition were encountered, and Flight Lieutenant Scarf was mortally wounded. This very gallant officer felt unable to make the longer  journey  back, to Butterworth, but managed  to  retain  consciousness  until he reached Alor Star, where he crash-landed without injury to his crew. He died in hospital that evening. He was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

198.  As a result  of this  day's operations against Singora, A.H.Q. decided that no more bombing by day should take place over land until  such  time  as fighter  escort could  be provided.

Preparations for withdrawal from the N.W.

199. At 0900 hours on the 9th, Adv. H.Q. Norgroup  opened  at  Bukit  Martajim  (near Butterworth), but it became evident that the evacuation of the N.W. bases could not long be delayed. Up till this time there had been no A.A.  defences at Butterworth.  Eight Bofors, guns arrived on the afternoon of the 9th but their presence was not, of course, any deterrent to high flying bombers.

200.  A.H.Q.,  therefore, issued instructions that all airfields on the mainland to the southward were to be got ready for immediate operational use. At the same time, orders were issued to do everything possible to improve dispersal arrangements at aerodromes on Singapore Island.

Evacuation of Kuantan Aerodrome on 9th December.

201. During the night of the 8-9th there were many reports of further landings on the East coast, fears of which were to persist throughout the brief campaign and cause many hours to be spent on coastal reconnaissance.

202. On the 9th, two pairs of Vildebeestes were sent at 0300 hours to sweep the coast north and south of Kuantan. During the day, 6 Hudsons were employed on similar duties whilst Catalinas extended the search area into the South China Sea.  The remainder of the aircraft at Kuantan stood by to attack whatever might be found.  Confirmation was obtained of the large concentration of ships of all natures unloading in the Singora-Patani area, but no threat of  further seaborne attack  was  discovered   although 3 Vildebeestes were despatched on a false report to attack a ship 60 miles east of Kuantan.

203. However, with the destruction of aircraft on the ground in N.W. Malaya in mind, it became evident to A.H.Q. that a dangerous congestion of aircraft existed at Kuantan, particularly vulnerable because there was no A.A,, protection there at all. Orders were issued to O.C. Kuantan, early on the 9th, to retain 12 Vildebeestes and the 13 Hudsons of Nos. 1 and 8 (GR) Squadrons, R.A.A.F., and to despatch the remainder to Singapore.

204. At noon the expected attack took place, and Kuantan was subjected to its first experience of high bombing, followed up by the bombers flying low and shooting up at will. A.H.Q. thereupon decided to evacuate Kuantan, the surviving 10 Hudsons and 8 Vildebeestes. returning to Singapore. The withdrawal of the ground party from Kuantan might have been better controlled. From then on Kuantan was available as an A.L.G. for refuelling only.

Reports of a landing at Kuantan—9-10th December, 1941.

205. During the night 9-10th, reports were received of a landing north of Kuantan. Six Vildebeestes and 3 Hudsons were ordered to attack. The Vildebeestes found 3 small ships and bombed them with doubtful results, but the Hudsons which arrived later found no target although they prolonged their search of the area past daylight. There is reason to believe that the beaches at Kuantan had been fired on during the night, but that the enemy force was only a light reconnaissance to test the. defences, and its size had been magnified in the telling.

206. Further bombing of Kuantan aerodrome on the morning of the 10th added to the uncertainty  of the situation  and  all  available bombers in Singapore were put at short notice to await developments. Sharks from the target-towing flight carried out reconnaissance of the approaches to Singapore, whilst Blenheim IV's from No. 34 (B) Squadron, using Kuantan for refuelling purposes, continued reconnaissance of the east coast up to 50 miles north of Singora, confirming once more the large concentration of shipping off the Siamese coast.

207. The false report of a landing at Kuantan proved to have a vital bearing on the movements of H.M.S. " Prince of Wales" and H.M.S. " Repulse ", and it is now necessary to turn to the events leading up to the sinking of these two vessels.

Sinking of H.M.S. " Prince of Wales " and " Repulse "—10th December, 1941.

208. The C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, decided to sail on the 8th December, 1941, with H.M.S. " Prince of Wales " and H.M S. " Repulse " accompanied by four destroyers, with the object of attacking the concentration of Japanese transports reported between Singora and Patani. He intended to arrive in the target area at dawn on the 10th December.

209.  Before leaving on the 8th December (p.m.) the C.-in-C. asked for the following: —

(a) Reconnaissance 100 miles to north of the force from daylight, Tuesday, the 9th December:

(b) Reconnaissance to Singora and beyond, ten miles from the coast, starting at first light on the 10th December:

(c) Fighter protection off Singora at daylight on the 10th December.

The A.O.C. gave tentative replies that he could provide (a), hoped to be able to provide (b), but could not provide (c). It was decided that he should go thoroughly into the problems involved and give definite replies to the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet (Rear Admiral Palliser), who remained at the Naval Base in close liaison with G.H.Q.

210. The doubt about the reconnaissance required in (b) above was due to the fact that the reconnaissance would have had to be provided by Blenheim IV's based on Kuantan, and it was uncertain whether this aerodrome would be out of action or not.

211. The reason why the fighter protection asked for in (c) could not be provided was mainly  that  the  northern  aerodromes  were either untenable or else had been badly damaged by bombers; this meant that the fighters would have to operate from aerodromes at considerable distance from Singora, and, owing to the short endurance of the Buffalo, would have been able to remain only a very short time over the Singora area before having to return to refuel.   These factors meant that a short patrol might possibly have been provided at intervals at Singora, but that it was impossible to guarantee appreciable fighter protection.

212. On the evening of the 8th December the A.O.C. confirmed his tentative replies to the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet, and this information was passed by the latter to the C.-in-C. The signal as received on board " Prince of Wales " expressly stated that no fighter protection could be provided on 10th December, 1941. The words " off Singora " did not appear in the text of the signal, tout were implied in the light of Admiral Phillips' request (para. 209 (c)).

213. The  agreed  air reconnaissances  were carried  out  on  both  the 9th and 10th December.

214. In the early hours of 10th December a signal was received at Singapore indicating that the Fleet might return sooner than was originally planned. Apart from this no communication was received from the C.-in-C. and his position was unknown.

215. Suddenly, shortly after 1200 hours on the 10th December, a signal, originating from H.M.S. " Repulse ",  was received in the Operations Room at A.H.Q. of enemy air attacks on H.M.S. " Prince of Wales " and " Repulse " in a position some 60 miles Eastwards of Kuantan.  No. 453 (F) Squadron (11 aircraft), which was standing by specifically to provide protection for these ships in case of their return to Singapore, left six minutes later, only to arrive in the area, 165 miles away, to find destroyers picking up survivors from these two great vessels.  For the rest of the day a number of sorties by flying boats and fighters was carried out in connection with the return of these destroyers to Singapore.

216. It subsequently transpired that the Fleet had been located by Japanese reconnaissance p.m. 9th December, and that later the same day the C.-in-C. received news of a landing at Kuantan (in para. 205). These two events must have decided the C.-in-C. to abandon the Singora operation and to close Kuantan on the 10th December.

217. Had the C.-in-C. notified his change of plan, it is conceivable that A.H.Q. might have moved No. 453 (F) Squadron to Kuantan where it could have stood by at call: R / T inter-communication  between  the  two  ships  and  the squadron aircraft had already been arranged. Some effective support might then have been given.  Actually no call for assistance was sent until the Japanese attack had been pressed home, by which time intervention from Singapore was impossible.

218. It also transpired later that the ships had been attacked by a force of high level bombers backed by a large number of torpedo-bombers, that both ships had suffered a number of hits by torpedoes and had thus been sunk. The sinking of these two ships was a serious shock to the morale of everybody in the Far East. Their loss, combined with the American losses at Pearl Harbour, gave the Japanese an undisputed command of the sea in Malayan waters.  The reactions of this state of affairs upon the subsequent dispositions of air units, with particular reference to the share they were able to take in the land battle, will become clear later in the narrative.

Arrival of Dutch Reinforcements.

219. During the morning of 9th December the three Dutch Bomber (22 Glenn Martins) and one Fighter (9 Buffaloes) Squadrons arrived at Sembawang and Kallang respectively in accordance with the mutual reinforcement plan. It was found that the Dutch bomber crews were not trained in night flying, and so one squadron (9 aircraft) was sent back to the N.E.I. to train; the intention being, on its return, to send back the other squadrons in succession for the same purpose. As A.H.Q. had already decided not to use British bomber squadrons in their bombing role by day until fighter escort or cover could be provided (see para. 198), it was obviously essential to apply the decision to the Dutch bomber squadrons, particularly as their Glenn Martins were slower and no better protected than the British Blenheims.

Air Forces driven out of Aerodromes in N.W. Malaya.

220. Meanwhile in Northern Malaya it was evident that the main line of advance by the Japanese Army was from Singora across Malaya to the Alor Star area.  The advanced troops of the 11th (Indian) Division were still holding a position near the frontier but the vital Ledge position on the Kroh-Patani road had not yet been secured.

221. Bombing of our aerodromes in N.W. Malaya continued during the 10th December and A.H.Q.  decided that the area must be evacuated.    From Butterworth No.  62  (B) Squadron (reduced to 2 aircraft) was evacuated to Taiping: No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. (6 repairable aircraft) to Ipoh, where 8 Bofors guns had by now been installed, leaving No. 27 (NF) Squadron (nil serviceability) still at Butterworth. All the unserviceable aircraft of Nos. 27, 34 (B) and 62 (B) Squadrons which were capable of flying were flown to Singapore for repair.

222. The withdrawal of the ground parties was carried out under difficult circumstances.

Units had been subjected to severe and constant bombing and machine gun attacks on scantily defended aerodromes where they saw no effective means of hitting back, and aircraft were remorselessly destroyed on the ground without replacement. The apparent opportuneness of the enemy's attacks (see para. 183) and pernicious rumours of disaster in the land fighting added their influence. There was no senior officer at Butterworth with sufficient weight to take control, and some of the personnel of No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. and No. 27 (NF) Squadron R.A.F., both of which had already been driven out of Sungei Patani, did not behave at all steadily. Other units, however, maintained their order.

223. The difficulties of all units was intensified by the wholesale, but understandable, disappearance  of  unenlisted  native  followers— cooks, MT. drivers, sanitary personnel etc.— and only improvised arrangements were possible for replacing them by European personnel at the dislocation of the latter's normal work.

The defection of labour spread to the railway area.

224. Withdrawals were nevertheless effected successfully and,  in the case of units  other than those mentioned above, in good order. It was due to the untiring energy of a small party headed by Flight Lieutenant R. D. I. Scott, who himself drove a locomotive,  that much R.A.F. equipment was removed south.

225. In an endeavour to improve repair and maintenance  facilities  in  N.W.  Malaya,  an R. & S U. was formed at this time from No. 151 M.U. at Seletar and was ordered to Taiping; on arrival it detached a Mobile Salvage Section to Butterworth to assist in the work of salving material.

226. Meanwhile, during the commencement of the denial schemes at Alor Star on 10th December,  the sight of large fires and the sounds of explosions in their rear had caused some concern amongst our forward troops. Orders were therefore issued to the Commander, Norgroup, that no fires were to be started and no  demolitions  by  explosives  carried  out. Buildings were to be damaged only, petrol and oil run to waste, and the demolition of aerodromes with the help of explosives was to be left to Corps Royal Engineers to co-ordinate with the operations of our troops.

Scale of Enemy Aw Effort.

227. It was computed that on the 8th, 9th and 10th December the Japanese had used a daily average of over 120 aircraft in N. Malaya, mostly against R.A.F. aerodromes. Fighters and some bombers were based on S.E. Siam, the majority of bombers on Indo-China.  It was estimated that over 100 aircraft were based in the Singora—Patani area and at least 280 in Indo China.  Types identified were:—

Fighters—Navy " 0 ".

Twin Engine  Bombers—Navy  96  and Army 97.

Dive Bombers—Junkers 87N  (Japanese version).

Formation of War Council, Malaya.

228. On the 10th December Mr. Duff Cooper, whose ministerial duties had taken him to Singapore, formed a War Council, the composition of which was as follows:—

Mr. Duff Cooper, Chairman;

H.E. the Governor of the Straits Settlements,

C.-in-C., Far East;

C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet;

G.O.C., Malaya;

A.O.C., Far East;

and later, Sir George Sansom as being responsible for propaganda and Press control, and the late Mr. Bowden as representative of the Australian Government.

This War Council met daily for deliberation, mainly in connection with the conduct of the war in Malaya.

Events on the 11h December, 1941.

229. On 11th December the squadrons in N. Malaya were not in a position to take offensive action. Coastal reconnaissance, however, to the north of Kuantan by sections of Hudsons, continued. Catalinas extended the search into the S. China Sea, whilst P.R. Buffaloes continued to register Japanese activities off the South Siamese coast. Enemy submarine reports necessitated the despatch of sections of Vildebeestes without result.

230. No.  21  (F)  Squadron,  R.A.A F.  at Ipoh had no aircraft available for tactical reconnaissance for IIIrd Corps, and so A.H.Q. issued orders that the squadron was to be brought up to strength (16 I.E.) immediately with a proportion of new pilots.

231. Eighty  Japanese  aircraft  attacked Penang Town; no aircraft were available for its protection.

232. On the ground, in addition to advances in the N E. and N.W., the Japanese had infiltrated down the east coast as far as Trengannu. In  the north-west, where the main Japanese forces were  advancing,  there was considerable  pressure  on the  nth  (Indian) Division, but no major action had been fought. Attacks from the air on our forward troops increased in weight on the nth, though the enemy  air  effort  was  still  being  expended chiefly on our aerodromes.

233. To assist in the defence of Borneo the Dutch placed at Sinkawang under A.H.Q. operational control one squadron of (9) Glenn Martins and one flight of (4) Buffaloes.

Consideration of Bomber Policy.

234. On the evening of the nth December it was decided to attack  Singora aerodrome once more, the arrival over the objective 4o be just before first light on the 12th.  Eight aircraft of No. 34  (B) Squadron at Tengan were detailed.  The attack was unsuccessful: few aircraft got through the bad weather and others were lost as a result of it.

235. This raid was carried out as part of the current policy for bombing Japanese aerodromes in order to reduce the scale of their air activity against our ground forces. The Air Staff at A.H.Q., however, favoured the view that the correct employment of air forces, was in the attack, of the shipping and troop concentrations in the Singora area, where the mam landing had taken place, and through which reinforcements were still entering. They felt that the time had not yet come to concentrate on co-operation with the Army to delay the Japanese advance on the ground. Furthermore, the resources available tor the bombing of aerodromes were not sufficient to produce any real effect on the Japanese effort. This was the view of the A.O.C., but he considered that he could not allter the policy which was selected to meet the wishes of the G.O.C., Malaya, who was anxious that actioin should be designed to reduce the scale of air attack on our troops. The G.O.C. was approached again at about this time, but reiterated that " bomber policy must give immediate relief to his troops " which, in his view, could only be achieved by bombing aerodromes. (See next paragraph.)

236. Note by Lieut.-General A. E. Perctval.

" I have no recollection of this approach. In any case I am quite certain that there was no strong difference of opinion on the subject between the late Air Vice Marshal Pulford and myself. I would point out that there had been practically no air attacks on the ground troops up to that time, so it was very unlikely that I should press for immediate relief of the troops. At the same time I have always held, and still do, that the first essential in any campaign is to obtain some measure of control in the air. By nth December the "Japanese fighters, most of which were based on Singora aerodrome, had established control of the air over Northern Malaya. As long as they held that control the chances of our aircraft doing damage to Japanese shipping and troop concentrations in the Singora area was remote. Before that could be done it was necessary to regain some measure of air control. The only chance of doing this was to destroy a number of enemy fighters on their congested and weakly defended aerodrome. Therefore, if I did press for an attack on the aerodrome, it would have been for that reason and not to provide immediate relief for the ground troops."

237. The G.O.C.'s point of view was confirmed by G.H.Q. who,  on 12th December, issued a War Instruction, the relevant paragraph of which read:—

" For the present, assistance to the 11th Ind.  Division  is to  take precedence over other R.A.F. offensive tasks."

On the 12th December the C.-in-C. visited A.H.Q and re-emphasised the importance of providing support to the Army in the northwest.

Provision of Support for the Army.

238.  On the 11th/12th December the land position in the north-west worsened.  The nth (Indian) Division was attacked in and forced to evacuate the Jitra position,  and Krohcol came under heavier attacks.  The withdrawal of the latter force would have had grave consequences as it would have exposed the communications of the nth Indian Division and thus necessitated a general withdrawal out of Kedah province.

239. The only aircraft still available in the area for direct support of the Army were two or three Buffaloes of No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., at Ipoh; the rest of the squadron was being re-equipped at Singapore. The A.O.C. decided, therefore, to send the aircraft and pilots of No. 453 (F) Squadron from Singapore to Ipoh where they would be serviced by the ground crews of No. 21 Squadron. It was intended to return them to Singapore when the rest of No. 21 Squadron had been re-equipped.

240. No. 453 (F) Squadron arrived at Ipoh on the morning of the 13th and began operating from there, using Butterworth as an advanced landing ground. Connection was established with the Observer Corps Operations Room at Kuala Lumpur in the hope of obtaining at least a short warning of attacks upon the station.

241. Operations were vigorously undertaken from Ipoh between the  13th  and  the  15th December.   Japanese convoys were attacked on  the  road  Simpang—Alor  Star—Kepala Bantas.  Tactical reconnaissances were carried out, and enemy bombers and reconnaissance aircraft in the area were engaged with some success, notably on the 13th when five enemy aircraft attacking Penang were claimed by the squadron.   As a result, it was reported that the morale of our troops sharply appreciated

242.  On the 15th December No. 21  (F) Squadron,  R.A.A.F.,  left  Singapore  to  reinforce Ipoh, but owing to bad weather five aircraft force-landed and crashed and only six aircraft got through.

243.  Operations in support of the  Army seriously  reduced  the  serviceability  of  No. 453  (F)  Squadron, and further losses were caused by the intensive bombing of Ipoh aerodrome, which now started.  In consequence, on the 15th December, G.H.Q. issued an instruction that the role of the Ipoh fighter force was primarily reconnaissance for IIIrd Corps: it was not to be used against ground targets, and wastage was not to be made good at the expense of the squadrons allotted to the defence of Singapore.  In practice, the squadrons in the north functioned mainly in the defence of the Ipoh area, carrying out such tactical reconnaissance as was required by IIIrd Corps.  They continued in this role at Kuala Lumpur, to which enemy air attacks drove them on the December.

Demolition of Aerodromes.

244.  The salvage of equipment from aerodromes in north-west Malaya continued. Sungei Patani, Butterworth and Taiping were successively cleared, and all stores and personnel sent back to Kuala Lumpur by road and rail for sorting.

245. Experience was to show that the demolition of aerodrome surfaces had little more than nuisance value, and only slightly retarded the Japanese efforts to; bring them into service for their own forces. Speedy repairs were possible because: —

(a) large stocks of road-metal had been accumulated on each aerodrome for repairs, and it proved too bulky for removal and denial to the enemy (para. 30);

(b) occupation by the Japanese followed demolition so quickly that the heavy rains had no time to take effect;

(c) the abundant native labour was forcibly impressed by the enemy for repair work.

Air Forces driven out of North-West Malaya.

246. As early as the 20th December Japanese bombers and fighters were using aerodromes in the north-west, particularly Sungei Patani, and the scale of attack in the Kuala Lumpur area correspondingly increased  By the afternoon  of  22nd  December  these  attacks had reduced the combined strength of Nos. 21 (F) R.A.A.F. and 453 (F) Squadrons to four operationally serviceable aircraft.

247. In view of the enemy's great numerical superiority, further attempts to reinforce these squadrons only meant dissipating aircraft from their main role—the defence of Singapore.  It was decided, therefore, to withdraw the force to Singapore, and this was done on 23rd December.  It meant that operations in support of the Army in the north-west could be undertaken only by using Kuala Lumpur and other airfields to the south of that place as advanced landing grounds.

248. These two fighter squadrons had been forced to operate under very difficult conditions.  Maintenance and servicing facilities had been necessarily primitive, whilst the warning system gave little, if any, notice of attack.

249. However, the unexpectedly high calibre of Japanese aircraft and pilots, and the superior numbers of the enemy, had proved too much for them.

250. Nevertheless, the work of these squadrons had had a good effect on the attitude of our troops to the air, although the number of enemy aircraft shot down was only small.

251. With the withdrawal of the R.A F. from the north-west, Norgroup was disbanded, and a Liaison Officer was left at H.Q. IIIrd Corps.

Army Situation.

252. While these operations and moves of air forces had been taking place the Army had been compelled to give more ground. On 15th December the Japanese forced the nth (Indian) Division to evacuate the Gurun position, and threatened to push through the gap between the division and Krohcol. A big withdrawal had therefore to be made out of Kedah province to the Krian river. Penang was thus left isolated and was evacuated on the night of 16th/17th December.

253.  Between the 17th and 26th December our forces fought for the Taiping—Ipoh area, preparatory to taking up positions in the Kampar district, which offered the best possibilities  for prolonged defence in this part of Malaya.

254. The prospects of stabilising the situation, however, were not good; and as early as 16th December the sole Command reserve, consisting of a Brigade Group, had been committed to the fighting in the north-west.

255. In the rest of Malaya were: —

(i) A Brigade Group which was in process of being withdrawn from the State of Kelantan.

(ii) A Brigade Group at Kuantan which was already threatened by Japanese infiltration down the Trengganu coast.

(iii) A Division (2 Brigades) of the Australian Imperial Forces in Johore, whose particular role was to guard against landings in the Mersing area on the east coast of Malaya.

(iv) The garrison of Singapore Fortress.

All these formations were either already committed actively or potentially. Adequate reinforcement for the main battle area therefore depended upon the safe arrival of reinforcements from outside Malaya. But before dealing with this aspect it is first necessary to dispose of some other matters.

Preparations for basing squadrons in the N.E.I.

256. The evacuation of the northern aerodromes had been foreseen, and as this would eventually result in congestion of aerodromes on Singapore Island, A.H.Q. issued orders as early as the I4th December for stocks of bombs together with refuelling and re-arming parties to be sent to aerodromes in Sumatra.  Shortly afterwards, two staff officers from A.H.Q. and an officer of the A.M.W.D. were ordered to Sumatra  to  accelerate  work  in  connection with:—

(a) providing facilities for the transit of reinforcing aircraft;

(b) the  operation   of  bombers  from Sumatra, including the selection of a Bomber Group H.Q.

257. For these movements it was possible to call upon an Air Transport service from Singapore-Sumatra-Java which had been instituted by the Dutch Army Air Service.  The number and capacity of the transport aircraft were limited, but they enabled the movements to Sumatra to be carried out rapidly.    They illustrated the value of transport aircraft.  It was considered inadvisable to operate these aircraft in Northern Malaya where little fighter protection could have been provided for them.

258. A warning order was also issued on the 22nd December for moving No. 153 M.U. from Kuala Lumpur to Java. By that date the Japanese had advanced as far south as Taiping, and Kuala Lumpur was threatened.   Thus it was felt that the work of the unit could be more satisfactorily carried out in Java.

Japanese Attack on Borneo.

259. It is now necessary to revert to operations off the East coast of Malaya leading up to the Japanese attack on Borneo.

On the 13th December G.H.Q. received information from a reliable source that a large convoy of well over a hundred ships was heading S.S.W. from the direction of Saigon. Its destination was not known for some days. It constituted a serious threat to Malaya, on the east coast of which existed several good landing beaches with little or no defence, where a successful landing would have seriously jeopardised our army formations still closely engaged with the enemy on the western side of the peninsula.

260. Accordingly, reconnaissance activity from Malaya was materially increased, and during the period I3th to 24th December most of the available bombers stood by to attack the enemy convoy in the event of its approach.

261. An average of 2 Catalina, 6 Hudson and 6 Glenn Martin sorties was sent out daily from Malaya to locate the expedition, whilst Dutch Glenn Martins from Sinkawang in Dutch Borneo were similarly employed.  On the I4th, 6 cruisers were reported south of Saigon, and on the afternoon of the 16th a landing was reported at Miri, in British Borneo.  The ships in the area were attacked by the Dutch in bad weather on the 17th, 18th and 19th. Hits were claimed on a cruiser and transports, and several near misses against transports.

262. The reconnaissance activity continued, spreading south-east to the Rhio Archipelago, and on the 23rd December an expedition heading  towards  Kuching was detected. Both Kuching and Sinkawang aerodromes had been attacked by Japanese aircraft on the preceding days, and the former had been " blown ". The Dutch aircraft at Sinkawang were withdrawn to Palembang in Sumatra on the 24th, though before they were transferred they were able to carry out a few attacks against the enemy convoy.

263. This same convoy was attacked on the 24th by 3 Hudsons and also by 5 Blenheim IVs of No. 34 (B) Squadron. Several near misses were claimed but no positive sinkings. A Dutch submarine claimed to have sunk 3 transports and 1 tanker in the area.

Increased Air Reconnaissance activity.

264. Seaward reconnaissance at this time absorbed almost all the G.R. and bomber aircraft in Malaya.  In addition to major Japanese expeditions east of  Malaya, Japanese forces were still infiltrating southwards down the East coast  towards  Kuantan; and on the 15th December a flight of M.V.A.F. was established at Kahang to carry out local coastal reconnaissance for the Australian forces in Johore who were responsible for guarding against landings in the Mersing-Endau area. Reconnaissance up the West coast also became an increasing  commitment  during the second half of December. Regular reconnaissances were instituted from 22nd December, as the Japanese were already showing signs of infiltrating in small boats by day and night down the West coast behind our Army's left flank. The discovery and attack of -these infiltrations was difficult because the boats moved in waters flanked by luxuriant tropical undergrowth.  By day the Japanese protected their movements with fighter patrols.

265. The possibility that the Japanese might spread across from Malaya to Sumatra had also to be faced, thus a squadron of Dutch Glenn Martins at Pakenbaroe in Sumatra were employed on reconnaissance to detect any such movement with effect from 15th December.

Minor Reorganisations.

266. Meanwhile, certain reorganisation of squadrons had taken place. One flight of Wirraways (6) was formed at Kluang on the 18th and training in dive-bombing commenced. The aircrews of No. 60  (B) Squadron were sent back to Burma by sea by B.O.A.C. to join their ground personnel at Rangoon: the squadron's aircraft were taken over by No. 62 (B) Squadron.

Order of Battle—24th December, 1941.

267. At this stage of the campaign the disposition of squadrons and their approximate strengths in serviceable aircraft were as follows:—

Reinforcement Situation

268. From the 8th December onwards many messages had been interchanged between the Air Ministry and the Far East on the subject of reinforcements, which, commencing with a long-range policy of supply, developed, with the steady advance of the Japanese Army, into an emergency arrangement of diverting to the Far East squadrons from other Commands which it was hoped could arrive in time. By the 25th December, the position as understood by A.H.Q. was:—

Hudson II's —6 arrived from Australia on 25/12 to reinforce Nos. 1 and 8 (GR) Squadrons, R.A.A.F.

Hudson III's —15-2 to be flown out from England commencing about 20/12.

Blenheim IVs —12 from Middle East—7 arrived by 25/12: remainder en route.

Hurricanes —51 in crates with 24 pilots en route by sea due oh or about 8th January, 1942. These had left England as reinforcements for the Middle East but were diverted to Singapore whilst at sea.

Catalinas —4 en route with 2 spare crews. The Plan for their disposition was:—

Hudson III's —to

(a) re-equip No. 62

(b) Squadron: and (6) reinforce Nos. 1 and 8 (GR) Squadrons R.A.A.F.

Blenheim IVs —to be absorbed into No. 34 (B) Squadron.

Hurricanes —to be used from Kallang and Johore in defence of Singapore it was anticipated Buffalo Squadrons would be whittled away by the time these Hurricanes arrived.

Catalinas —One to remain at Ceylon, remainder to reinforce No. 205 (FB) Squadron at Seletar.

Thus some air reinforcements, urgently wanted, were now on their way despite the still critical state of the war in Europe from which they had had to be diverted to Singapore

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