|
Intelligence Organisation
67. In June, 1941, A.H.Q., had no Intelligence Organisation of its own: All air intelligene personnel and records in the Far East had been centralised in the Combined Intelligence Bureau (F.E.C.B.) which functioned under the control of C.-in-C. China Station. Theoretically it served inter alia, the needs of A.H.Q. In practice, however, its means for obtaining air information throughout the Far East was totally inadequate; its staff was insufficient to cope fully even with G.H.Q. Air Intelligence requirements; and although the information it possessed was always available to A.H.Q., F.E.C.B. had not the means of supplanting the missing intelligence machinery at A.H.Q.
Representations were therefore made by A.H.Q. of the need for a thorough intelligence system throughout the Command. About July, a conference was held with G.H.Q., who wished to create a second Combined Intelligence Centre to serve the joint needs of A.H.Q. and H.Q.M.C. A second joint organisation of this nature would not, however, have been suitalble for building up the Intelligence organisation required throughout the Command at all levels from A.H.Q. downwards. This view was accepted.
An establishment for an Intelligence organisation for the whole Command was drawn up and submitted to the Air Ministry, and in late autumn, in anticipation of approval, personnel were made available locally and were appointed to H.Q. and Units. The nucleus organisation thus formed was fortunately in being when hostilities broke out, but its development was backward, land in "particular the information it had collated for briefing crews was scanty.
68. According to intelligence current in the Command, the efficiency of the Japanese Naval Air Units was known to be good, but that of their Army Air Units was not high despite the fanatical valour of their personnel.
This wrong assessment of their Army Air Units was partly due to the fact that the system for collecting intelligence throughout the Far East was only sufficient to enable F.E.C.B. to obtain incomplete air information and the reliability of most of this was far from high. And it was partly due to the fact that A.H.Q., stations and squadrons possessed only the embryonic intelligence organisation already referred to: the result was that such intelligence as the Command received, was not effectively digested, promulgated or acted upon. - A particular outcome of this state of affairs, which was destined to have far-reaching consequences in Malaya, was that the personnel of the Command remained unaware up to the outbreak of war of the qualities of the Japanese fighter squadrons, whose Zero fighters were to prove superior -in performance to our own. fighters. This naturally affected training in our Squadrons, particularly in the tactics to be adopted by our fighters.
The need for an Operational Training Unit.
69. The Air Ministry had been unable to approve requests made during the year to establish an O.T.U., in Malaya. But in September, 1941, owing to the fact that large numbers of personnel required operational training, A.H.Q. established a makeshift Q.T.U. at Kluang from the resources available in the Command. Its role was:—
(a). To train pilots for Fighter Squadrons who had been, for some time, arriving from New Zealand: direct from Service Flying Training Schools, and who therefore lacked operational training.
(b) To convert personnel of No. 36 and No. 100 (T.B.) Squadrons from Vildebeestes to twin-engine aircraft in anticipation of their re-equipment with Beauforts.
(c) To train pilots from New Zealand on twin-engine aircraft to fill vacancies in Bomber Squadrons.
Training aircraft were provided, from Wirraways thrown up by No. 21 (F) Squadron when it re-armed with Buffaloes, and by Blenheims borrowed from No. 34 (B) Squadron. The Wing Commander Training at A.H.Q. (Wing Commander Wills-Sandford) was appointed Commanding Officer. The Unit had to be disbanded on 8th December, on the outbreak of hostilities, but it had completed most valuable work.
Lack of Armament Training Facilities
70. Up till October 1941, the only armament training facilities in the Command were on Singapore Island, and at an improvised air range near Penang. Maximum use was made of the Singapore ranges, but they were very insufficient to meet requirements. In October 1941, the new Command Armament Training Station at Kuantan was opened, but there was time for one squadron only to complete a course before the outbreak of war.
71. The air firing situation was particularly unsatisfactory. There was an acute shortage of target towing aircraft, and the few available were slow.'
Lack of Transport and Communication Aircraft.
72. The lack of transport and communication aircraft was acutely felt during the pre-war period when training was all important. G.H.Q. and H.Q.M.C. had frequently to ask for communication flights, aircraft for which had necessarily "to be found, mainly by G.R. Squadrons. Although such requests were pruned- and co-ordinated, flights were nevertheless sufficiently frequent to interfere seriously with the training of squadrons, many of whose vital flying hours were thus expended. Furthermore, visits to subordinate units by A.H.Q. staff had to be correspondingly curtailed.
Fighter Squadrons.
73. In June-July 1941 a Fighter Group Operational Cadre was formed to take over the training and operation of all fighter "aircraft in Singapore: the Senior Officer (Group Captain E.B. Rice) at the same time being appointed Air Defence Co-ordinator, Malaya.
74. The following Fighter Squadrons, with an establishment of 16 I.E., and 8 I.R. Buffaloes, were formed on the dates shown:-
No. 67 (F) Squadron, formed at the end of March 1941. The Squadron and two Flight Commanders to be appointed from U.K., the remaining pilots from bomber squadrons within the Command Establishments were completed with pilots from New Zealand F.T.S's. The Squadron was transferred to Burma in October 1941, shortly after it had been passed as operationally efficient (para. 56).
No. 243 (F) Squadron, formed in April, 1941. Personnel were found as in the case of No. 67 Squadron, but a slightly higher proportion were F.T.S. personnel.
No 453 (F) Squadron, formed October 1941. The Squadron and two Flight Commanders were appointed from U.K. This was an R.A.F. " infiltration " squadron filled from F.T.S's in Australia. Some of the personnel were not entirely suitable for a Fighter Squadron, and the Squadron Commander was in Australia selecting replacements when war broke out.
No. 488 (F) Squadron, formed in October-November 1941. The Squadron and two Flight Commanders came from U.K. This was an R.N.Z.A.F. infiltration squadron and was filled from F.T.S's in New Zealand with excellent material; but their standard of flying on arrival was backward. This squadron had taken over the aircraft on which No. 67 (F) Squadron had trained, and many of these were in poor condition.
No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., which had formed as a General Purpose Squadron in Australia and moved into the Command in 1940, was in October 1941 re-equipped with Buffaloes and converted into a Fighter Squadron, with 12 I.E. and 6 I.R. aircraft. The Squadron had been previously equipped with 2-seater Wirraways, some of which were "returned to Australia, the remainder" being retained to assist in training Nos. 453 (F) and 488 (F) Squadrons. It will be observed, therefore, that the pilots of this squadron had not been selected originally for fighter aircraft, and some were not in fact entirely suitable for this role.
75. The main role of the Buffalo Squadrons was "day defence" only, primarily of the Singapore area, but night flying training was instituted to ensure that pilots could, take off before dawn and land after nightfall.
76. Except for No. 488 (F) Squadron all the above squadrons were considered operationally trained by the outbreak of war. No. 488 (F) Squadron was deficient in squadron and flight training and was not passed as operationally ready until the latter "half of December 1941. Training and assessment of operational readiness had, however, been- based on an Under-estimation of the enemy. The tactics thus taught and practised proved unsuitable and costly against the Japanese Navy '' 0 " fighter, which was greatly superior to the Buffalo in performance. Moreover, advanced training had suffered because, prior, to the formation of an O.T.U. in September 1941 (see para. 69), all pilots had joined, their squadrons without having received individual operational training.
77. The standard of gunnery in all-squadrons was low because: —
(a) Towing aircraft were very slow and there were very few of them
(b) Cine gun equipment was lacking
(c) Continual trouble was experienced with 'the .5 gun and synchronising gear. This was largely overcome by local modification by October 1941. Nevertheless, pilots were still not confident about their armament when war overtook them.
78. The Buffalo had a disappointing performance. It was heavy and underpowered and had a slow rate of climb. Maintenance was heavy, which meant a low standard of serviceability. Wastage during training was high, and many of the aircraft in Squadrons suffered from rough handling. The Buffalo had no V.H.F. radio, and the maximum range of R.T./W.T. was 9 miles, being frequently less when atmospherics were bad. Intercommunication between aircraft was unreliable.
79. There was one multi-seat fighter squadron in the Command, No. 27, a night fighter squadron equipped with Blenheim I's. Aircraft were old and in poor condition and were thus of limited value in a night-fighting role. Its conversion into a bomber squadron, for which personnel were available, came up for consideration but could not be adopted owing to the need for retaining a night fighter unit.
Observer Corps.
80. In July, 1941, control of an existing Observer Corps system was transferred from the Army to A.H.Q. It had been organised chiefly as part of the civil air raid warning system, and needed a great deal of development for use in an active air defence system. The personnel were enthusiastic, but unfortunately little time was available to train them in their new duties. It was found impossible to establish the necessary Observer Posts in the jungle-clad mountainous country of Central Malaya where there was, therefore, a serious gap in the warning system. Observer Corps Operations Rooms were established at Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and were linked up to the Dutch system in the Rhio Archipelago to the South, but difficulty was experienced in organising the whole through lack of existing telephone communications in Malaya and to an acute shortage of telephone material and equipment.
Radar Stations.
81. The approved policy of priority for the development of radar facilities was:—
(a) Singapore Island.
(b) The East Coast of Malaya.
(c) Penang and the West Coast.
All Stations were to look seaward with only restricted overland cover behind, the hinterland being covered by the Observer Corps.
82. By December, 1941, four stations were operating—Mersing, Tanah Merah Besar (in East of Singapore Island), Bukit Chunang (S.E. tip of Johore) and Tanjong Kupang (S.W. tip of Johore). A further station, Kota Tingi, in Johore was nearly ready and was being accelerated partly to close the gap down the central portion of Malaya. A sixth, at Kota Bahru, the most northerly point on the East Coast of Malaya, had been built but no radar had yet been installed.
The general position was, therefore, that there was fair cover for Singapore but little elsewhere.
Fighter Operations Room.
83. A Fighter Group Operations Room in Singapore was designed, constructed and occupied by December—almost too late to do more than break the ice of training its staff and fighter squadrons in the intricate art of fighter defence. It had an" operational staff only, no administrative branches: it was in fact an offshoot of the Air Staff of A.H.Q.
Fighter Considerations in General.
84. Thus an Air Defence system had been organised by the time war came. Whilst it was by no means as efficient as it would have been if the resources, time and equipment had not been so short, yet it provided Singapore with a scale of defensive effort which was by no means insignificant. Great credit is due to those who achieved this result with so short a time for preparation, outstanding amongst whom was the late Group Captain E.B. Rice.
Bomber and G.R. Land-based Squadrons.
85. There were two light bomber and two landplane G.R. squadrons in Malaya:—
No. 62 Squadron (Blenheim I)—Alor Star.
No. 34 Squadron (Blenheim IV)—Tengah.
No. 1 (R.A.A F.) Squadron (Hudson II) —Kota Bahru.
No. 8 (R.A.A.F.) Squadron (Hudson II) —Sembawang.
These two types of squadron, Bomber and G.R., are bracketed together because, owing to the small size of the total force, specialisation was impracticable. Although the Hudson squadrons were the main oversea reconnaissance force, the Blenheims had also to be trained in these duties. Similarly, both types of squadron had to be trained in all types of bombing over the sea and over the land, both by day and by night.
86. From May, 1940, until the Spring of 1941 there had been severe flying restrictions imposed on Blenheim Squadrons owing to the Jack of spares in the Command. During this period, flying hours were restricted to 5 hours monthly per I.E. aircraft. In Spring, 1941, selected pilots had to be withdrawn from these squadrons to assist in the formation of the first two fighter squadrons in Malaya.
87. Nos.1 and 8 (G.R.) Squadrons R.A.A.F. had reached a higher standard of training, but it was necessary for the Australian Air Board to withdraw crews as they became fully trained and to replace them by untrained crews, the former being required for the further expansion of the R.A.A.F. in Australia.
There was, therefore, in both types of squadron a wide variation between crews in the degree of their training, and especially in their efficiency in night flying, in which a high degree of skill was desirable for operating through the violent tropical thunderstorms which prevail over Malaya at night during the monsoons.
Torpedo / Bomber Squadrons.
88. There were two Torpedo/Bomber Squadrons, Nos. 36 and 100, both based on Seletar, the personnel of which were highly trained and of long experience. But their aircraft, Vildebeestes, which had a speed of 90 knots and an action radius of 180 miles, were obsolete. With modern aircraft these highly trained squadrons would have been invaluable, especially in the first days of the war. But their approved rearmament programme, with Beauforts, had been delayed by technical complications in production in Australia. In their training more emphasis was placed on the torpedo than the bomb, because -their main role was to attack enemy convoys well out to sea. Facilities for them to operate with torpedoes from Kota Bahru had been established.
Flying Boat Squadron.
89. There was one Flying Boat Squadron in the Command, No. 205 Squadron, based at Seletar with a detachment in Ceylon.
90. The squadron did not have sufficient trained crews. When its establishment was raised from 4 I.E. Singapore III's to 6 I.E. Catalinas, no additional crews were available. These were therefore trained by the squadron. One or two trained crews were based in Ceylon for work in the Indian Ocean, where, unfortunately, two crews were lost in accidents in September/October, 1941.
Photographic Reconnaissance.
91. Long-range Hurricanes had been requested for photographic purposes but were not available. In November, 1941, a P.R.U. with 2 I.E. (later raised to 4) aircraft was formed in Singapore with Buffaloes drawn from local resources, and personnel were trained in photographic reconnaissance. By stripping all armament and non-essential equipment and providing additional tankage, the Buffaloes range was increased to 1,400 miles. The formation of this flight proved a most valuable asset to the resources of the Command. Concurrently a Photographic Interpretation Unit was formed.
Malayan Volunteer Air Force
92. The Malayan Volunteer Air Force had flights located in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang. Its miscellaneous collection of about 30 aircraft comprised two Rapides, one Dragonfly, and a number of Moths and Cadets. Flights were organised for transport duties under A.H.Q., and for communication and reconnaissance in affiliation with Army formations. Moths were fitted with 20-lb. bomb racks and pilots were trained in their use, but none of the aircraft could be fitted with defensive armament. The enthusiasm of the unit was most marked and it made excellent progress.
Elementary Flying Training School
93. An E.F.T.S. had been established at Kallang in 1940 from local resources: instructors and technical personnel were obtained from units stationed in Malaya, and from the M.V.A.F., whose club aircraft were made available for its use. It did excellent work. A number of pilots were trained by it, some subsequently serving in other theatres of war and some in Malaya.
Signals Organisation
94. Signals organisation was generally backward. There was a shortage of W/T equipment, particularly of mobile sets.
Teleprinter lines existed between A.H.Q. and aerodromes on Singapore Island, but not between A.H.Q. and aerodromes up the peninsula.
There were two telephone lines from Singapore to N.W. Malaya and one to the N.E. and east. These were quite insufficient for joint needs, Army, Air Force and Civil, and all passed through civil exchanges. Secraphones were very few and were apportioned between the services in a strict order of priority.
There was no V.H.F., which limited the effective control of fighters to about 10 miles; this was still further limited by atmospherics during thunder periods.
Centralisation of Work at A.H.Q.
95. Appendices A and C will show how many, and scattered, were the units in the Far East Command and how varied were their duties by land, sea and air: their administrative problems were correspondingly numerous and varied.
A degree of decentralisation of work from A H.Q. was achieved by:—
(a) forming, in March, 1941, No. 221 Group H.Q., with a small staff in Rangoon, to which all work of formations in Burma was decentralised,
(b) forming, in March, 1941, No. 222 Group H.Q. in Ceylon for controlling flying boat operations based on Ceylon: this Group had no administrative staff, so that A.H.Q. continued to administer direct all its bases throughout the Indian Ocean.
(c) forming, in August, 1941, No. 224 . (Fighter) Group H.Q. in Singapore, for supervising fighter training and air defence arrangements within Singapore Island: this Group also had no administrative staff (see para. 83) so that A.H.Q. dealt direct with its stations and units on administrative matters.
But this was the limit of decentralisation.
It resulted in a heavy load of centralised work at A.H.Q. This was particularly felt once the expansion programme began to take effect. It fell heavily enough on Air Staff, but still more so on the Administrative Staff and on that of the Air Ministry Works Department.
The need for an A.O.C. Malaya, with an appropriate staff to whom to decentralise local problems in Malaya, became increasingly apparent during 1941, but it was not found possible to meet this need.
This state of affairs was complicated by a shortage of qualified officers—(see next paras.) —caused by the demands of the war in Europe.
Supply of Officers for Staff and Administrative Duties
96. Officers for filling vacancies on the staff of the greatly expanded A.H.Q. and all the new stations were largely found by enrolling personnel from Australia and New Zealand. More than 140 were obtained from this source. It was possible to give them only a short disciplinary course combined with a brief survey of their duties. Their average age was 45. They naturally varied much in their qualifications. The remainder, more than 50 in number, were obtained by commissioning local business men in Singapore; most of them just before, but some after the outbreak of war in the Far East. For them no training was practicable. The majority of these officers were willing and able, but their value was limited owing to their unavoidable lack of service knowledge, experience and training.
97. Of the regular officers, there were few with Staff experience; and the brunt of the work consequently fell on the few. The work of A.H.Q. was increased by the inexperience of officers at stations, which needed more " nursing " than is normally the case.
98. The strain fell particularly heavily upon the A.O.C., who despite "the great increase of work which was caused by the expansion of his Command, undertook much supervisory staff work which he would "have delegated to others in normal circumstances. He did so in order to ensure that it was properly carried out. This reacted unfavourably on his health, -which was poor even when he arrived. He overtaxed his strength, and was a tired man when war descended on Malaya.
Equipment Problems
99. The equipment position was bad • in many important items. Except for Buffaloes there were no reserve aircraft whatsoever in the Command. There was an acute shortage of spares, especially for Blenheims and even more for Hudsons, and also of all tools. M T. was very short, with an effect on mobility that has already been noted. Small arms were insufficient to arm more than a proportion of R.A F. personnel. All these were items which were badly needed during 1941 in Europe and Africa, and the requirements of the Far East had necessarily to take second place.
On the other hand, stocks of petrol and bombs laid in with G.H.Q.'s particular assistance were good.
Personnel Problems.
100. The following major personnel problems affected the efficiency of the Command: —
(i) There were no reserve aircrews.
(ii) The strength of the Command in airmen was doubled during the last six months of 1941, but most of these reinforcements came direct from training establishments in the United Kingdom and needed further training. At the same time, a number of time-expired airmen were relieved, with the result that at the outbreak of war three-quarters of the strength was new to Malaya.
(iii) A number of the reinforcements were posted to the Command in anticipation of the completion of the expansion programme They arrived faster than the expansion programme could absorb them. A surplus was therefore built-up, which was employed partly as infantry guards on Singapore Island to relieve the Army of such duties.
(iv) Special courses were, organised in musketry and in the expectation of the defection of native employees, in cooking and M.T. driving.
Other Measures.
101. The following preparatory measures were also put in hand:-
(i) An Air/Sea Rescue Service was organised. It was given six launches, and some light-aircraft of the Malayan Volunteer
Air-Force. It commenced operations in mid-; December, 1941, and altogether" saved -the
lives of 24 aircrew. Five of the launches
were provided locally.
(ii) A Bomb Disposal Unit was formed in
June, 1941, to serve all Services, including Civil Defence.
(iii) Welfare Services we're organised. Holiday facilities were provided at Butter-worth and Malacca. A fund of 20,000 dollars was raised and used by a central - welfare committee. Mobile canteens were made and equipped locally.
(iv) Arrangements were made for hospital-station and evacuation of R.A.F. sick and ' wounded; these facilities were provided" by the Army everywhere except within "the bounds of R.A.F. stations, where they were provided by the R.A.F.M.S.
*ie—an R A F as distinct from a Dominion squadron but manned by Dominions personnel.
|
