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Brigadier E.W. Goodman, D.S.O., M.C. |
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Despatch |
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Notes on the Campaign in Malaya from the Artillery Point of View submitted to Brigadier T.W. Corbett, C.B., M.C., War Department, Historical Section (India), Delhi on 13th April 1946
The campaign in Malaya was of a special character. It was a withdrawal of some 600 miles from the north of Malaya to the Island of Singapore, practically unrelieved by even local advances. Communications were on the whole poor. There was a fair network of second class roads, mostly suitable for one-way traffic only, in southern Kedah, Province Wellesley, Perak round Ipoh, Negri Sembilan and Malacca. In addition there were a number of estate roads not marked on the maps in use. The enemy were well aware of them though we were not in all cases. Elsewhere the only communications were a single north-south trunk road and a single line of metre gauge railway. The railway divided at Gemas, one line running up the west coast and eventually to Bangkok, the other running up the east side of the central range of hills through Kelantan and joining the west coast line at Haadyai in Thailand. This east coast line afforded the only communication with Kelantan, as the road stopped at Kuala Lipis and started again at Kuala Krai. Lateral communications were poor. On the Kuantan road a field battery took (from memory) anything from 12 to 7 hours [sic] to cross the Pahang river ferry at Jerantut. A second ferry and a new road crossing the Pahang at Temerloh, south of Jerantut, were under construction but not ready when war broke out.
There was little choice of battery positions. Guns were usually sited in the front edge of trees firing over a clearing. Cover from the air was easy to get, but movement under rubber was liable to become very difficult after heavy rain. Roads were usually bordered by ditches which had often to be bridged before vehicles or guns could get off the road. Except in padi and tin-mine areas, OPs in the usually accepted sense of the word, were non-existent and, in plantations, the field of view was restricted to a few yards. Even from the tops of hills little more could be seen than the tops of trees and scrub except in the few open areas.
Wireless proved unreliable for reasons which are mentioned below, and cable and telephone were much used. Consequently the communications of OP parties had not the flexibility which the close country demanded. Since cable had to be used up to the last minute before withdrawal, much was lost. Some of this loss might have been avoided had more training in picking up cable been given.
There was a great deal of accurate survey information available. The Survey Section, formed from personnel of the Survey of Malaya after war broke out, did the most excellent work in the production of survey information in the form required by the artillery (even to switch, angle of sight and range on occasions), provision of beacons, etc. Day to day meteor corrections were surprisingly constant and much accurate shooting was carried out off the map.
The effective support of infantry by artillery, difficult enough owing to natural conditions, was not rendered easier by the condition in which the artillery found itself.
Of the five regiments of field artillery immediately available for the operations in the north, two had only arrived in Malaya in the latter half of November 1941 after a three months’ voyage from England. Their men were not acclimatised; they were short of field training; none of the personnel had experience of the peculiar difficulties of terrain which they would encounter; they did not know their infantry and were practically one hundred per cent ignorant of the Indian soldier and of his language, though he formed the bulk of the infantry whom they had to support. When war broke out their equipment was incomplete and they were short of charged wireless batteries.
One regiment had arrived in September 1941, having left England about March and spent about four months in India. Owing to the late receipt of essential equipment fullest use of these four months had not been possible and their training was not complete.
The remaining two regiments, one field and one Indian mountain, were better acclimatised and trained but, in the case of the mountain regiment, training in wireless was not complete. The mountain regiment knew their infantry, the field regiment did not.
The unreliability of wireless mentioned above, was probably due to lack of training of personnel, lack of batteries and to local conditions, in what order or in what proportions I cannot say. Whether the sets provided were altogether suitable to tropical conditions is possibly open to doubt.
The Anti-tank regiment available at the outbreak of war, had arrived in Malaya early in November 1941. Its difficulties were much as those given above for field regiments. In addition it suffered two further disabilities. It had only been formed as a regiment one month before embarkation from the UK, by taking a battery from each of four different regiments. The first time the batteries were all together was at the port of embarkation. Secondly none of the infantry had more than a theoretical knowledge of anti-tank artillery and of co-operation with it. This resulted in the anti-tank guns often being forgotten and their not being informed of the time of withdrawal. Losses of anti-tank guns were considerable. Towing guns behind 15cwt trucks was not found satisfactory and it was often difficult or a very slow business reversing a truck on a narrow road. The regiment was able to obtain some trucks fitted for portée work and these proved more satisfactory, but did not overcome the difficulty of reversing. All these factors made the work of the anti-tank gunners much more difficult than it need have been.
When placing regiments in support of infantry brigades operating independently or widely separated from one another, the disadvantage of having regiments of 25 pounders and regiments of 4.5" howitzers at once became apparent. It was necessary to form composite groups of guns and howitzers in order to give each infantry brigade the advantage of the range of the 25 pounder. This was done by detaching complete batteries. Batteries had therefore to operate away from their regiments for considerable periods. Troops also were called upon to work independently. In such a withdrawal where communications were not good, the gun groups were found to be overburdened with transport and thinning out to wagon lines had to be resorted to.
It was soon discovered that, on a front supplied by only one road, two field artillery regiments were all that could be conveniently maintained in the withdrawal.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, a certain number of 18 pounder guns had been made available for beach defence at Kuantan and in Kelantan. Some of them had been used as saluting guns by Sultans and all, I think, were without sights. These were improvised by the RA OC. The guns were manned by Indian infantry and courses of instruction had been held and practice carried out under RA officers from the Defence Regiment in Singapore just before war began. Some of the guns did fire, but with what effect I never heard.
After the disaster at Slim River and the consequent amalgamation of 137 with 155 Field Regiment, the surplus personnel of 137 Field Regiment were sent down to Singapore. They were employed later to man beach defences (mostly 75mm) and lights disposed along the north shore of Singapore Island. There were similar guns and lights in the Australian sector of the north shore.
No Counter Battery organisation existed in Malaya in time of peace. Its want was not felt until the fighting on the Island, as the enemy had not used much artillery. But as soon as the withdrawal to the Island was complete it was obvious that there would be necessity for counter battery work as soon as the enemy began his assault. Accordingly an organisation was improvised from personnel of Coast Regiments. OPs were selected covering the north front. Difficulty was experienced in providing the necessary communications, but these were overcome and a HQ was established at the HQ of III Corps at Paya Lebar. The Ops were only dug in and that on Bukit Mandai could not be maintained owing to enemy shell fire. However, many batteries were fixed. After the enemy landed the principal OPs were speedily lost until the only one remaining that that on the roof of the Cathay building in Singapore, in which were also III Corps HQ. 135 Field Regiment, whose CO had previous experience of CB work, produced a very efficient organisation from its own resources.
Certain coast defence guns were used on land targets during the final stages of the campaign. A 15" gun shelled the main road near Bukit Timah. The Japanese were very anxious to know later what it was that had been shelling them.
There was no co-operation with the air that I every heard of. It was unlikely that there should have been any, owing to the lack of aeroplanes on our side and the enemy aerial supremacy.
There was little trouble about ammunition supply until the last few days. It then became necessary to restrict expenditure to 12 rpgpd for 25 pounders, except in the case of enemy attack. This was calculated on the assumption that no further supplies could reach Singapore for 90 days. During the retreat across the Island much ammunition was unavoidably lost. At the time of the capitulation the ammunition at our disposal was of the order of 70 rpg for 25 pounders with more for other types of field gun.
After 22 Mountain Regiment arrived back on Singapore Island it was reorganised. One battery was re-equipped with two 6" howitzers, which had been evacuated from Hong Kong, two batteries had six 3.7" howitzers each and the fourth battery had four 3.7" howitzers.
Singapore was by no means an easy area in which to deploy ten regiments of artillery. A large part of the Island is covered with dense jungle or rubber and very detailed reconnaissance is necessary to find positions. Fortunately Lieut-Colonel Dyson, commanding 122 Field Regiment, which had been stationed on the Island for some time before the Malayan Campaign, had had a thorough reconnaissance of the Island carried out and was able to produce a map marked with all possible battery areas. This was of the greatest possible use. Fortunately the line to be defended, the north shore of the Island, was clearly defined. Otherwise the deployment of the artillery would have been more difficult owing to the late date at which the reconnaissance of the area for infantry positions was begun.
Wagon lines were not always easy to find and often had to be a considerable distance back. Areas for them were in general confined to estates and were close to the road. Although estates were covered by a network of roads, usually fit for one-way traffic only, access from the main road was often limited to one or two entrances. These were not always designed to deal with heavy traffic. Areas had to be allotted by personal reconnaissance and not from the map, and traffic circuits had to be arranged. The allocation of rear areas to units for use as wagon lines needed more attention than it received. It was too often a case of ‘first come, first served’.
One lesson early learnt was that generally artillery must be responsible for its own local defence and always take the necessary precautions. OP parties and signallers had all to be armed. There was never a secure front behind which movement could be carried out without danger of meeting the enemy. |
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