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XIV. PLANNING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
43. In January I received information that Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, General Arnold, commanding the American air forces, and General Somervell, head of the American Service of Supply, would visit India after the Allied Conference at Casablanca to discuss plans for the recapture of Burma. They arrived at the end of January, and General Stilwell came also from China. Discussions were held on February 2nd and 3rd at Delhi. I had given orders some time previously for the preparation of a plan to recapture Burma during the cold weather of 1943-44, and the draft of this plan, which had been completed just before the arrival of the party, formed the basis of our discussions As a result of these I submitted to the Chiefs of Staff an outline plan which may be summarised as follows.
The plan provided for an offensive in three phases: —
Phase 1.—To begin in November 1943, consisted in an advance toy 10 Chinese divisions from Western Yunnan towards Myitkyina, Bhamo, Lashio, and eventually Mandalay; by the Chinese troops which had been trained at Ramgarh, from Ledo on Myitkyina; and by 3 British divisions from Manipur on Pakokku and Mandalay.
Phase 2.—Was to take place in December 1943, and was to consist of simultaneous seaborne assaults on the Western coast of Lower Burma, and landings were to be made on Ramree island, Taungup, Sandaway, Gwa, and Bassein, with the main object of securing airfields, also of advancing from Taungup on Prome; during this phase the British and Chinese advance in Upper Burma would be continued.
Phase 3.—Was to take place in January 1944, and was to consist of a direct seaborne and airborne assault on Rangoon, while the operations in Phases I and 2 continued. Field-Marshal Dill and General Arnold then went to Chungking to discuss the plan with the Generalissimo, and I took General Somervell for a short tour of the Eastern Front. We met again in Calcutta and confirmed the outline plan.
44. The plan was admittedly a bold and hazardous one; but it was the only one which offered, to my mind, a chance of recapturing Burma in one campaigning season, between two monsoons; and this was what I had been instructed to do The plan did not commend itself to my A.O.C.-in-C., Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, nor to Admiral Sir James Somerville, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, who had been unable to be present at the discussions with the Americans but who visited Delhi later in February. Their objections were mainly that the cover by air forces would be insufficient; and that the direct assault on Rangoon would be impracticable if the enemy installed a heavy scale of defences in the Rangoon river. My comment was that I thought that by the winter of 1943-44 the Japanese air strength might have been considerably reduced, and that while I agreed that an assault up the Rangoon river would be extremely hazardous if the Japanese had installed a heavy scale of defence, there was at present no sign that they had done so or intended to do so.
I never received from the Chiefs of Staff or War Cabinet either approval or condemnation of the plan; but the resources required to implement it were obviously not forthcoming. I had stated our requirements at 182,000 tons per month beginning in March if the plan was to be prepared and executed in the winter 1943-44. The shipping programmes for March and April provided less than half of this.
45. Meanwhile in the middle of February I had ordered my planning staff to prepare plans for operations against Sumatra and Java, so as to have available alternative plans, if the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided against the scheme for the reconquest of Burma. Plans for the capture of the Andaman Islands and for the invasion of Northern Sumatra were also examined.
46. I had intended to visit Australia in May to see the progress of the war against the Japanese in South-West Pacific, to learn what I could from their tactical methods and training, and to discuss the co-ordination of operations from India with those in South-West Pacific. I proposed then to suggest a visit to London in June to settle plans for the winter. When, however, I put this programme to the C.I.G.S. early in April, I,was instructed to proceed forthwith to U.K. without visiting Australia, to discuss future .plans for the war against Japan. I left India on April 18th and arrived in London on April 22nd.
47. The War Cabinet did not favour the plan I had proposed and which the Americans had accepted. It was decided to discuss operations from India against Japan at a conference in Washington to which I accompanied the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff, with the A.O.C.-in-C., India, and the Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet.
The discussions in Washington did not result in any new proposals for action from India in 1943-44. It was decided that—
(a) First priority should be given to developing the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month;
(b) There should be land and air operations into Upper Burma from Ledo and Imphal, 'combined with a Chinese advance from Yunnan.
(c) Akyab and Ramree Islands should be captured by amphibious operations.
In fact, the only difference from my plan for 1942-43 (see paragraph 2) was the addition of Ramree Island to the objectives.
48. On the instructions of the Prime Minister I returned to London from Washington for further discussions. In June, His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to appoint me to be Viceroy of India, and on June 20th I was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief in India by General Sir Claude Auchihleck.
Notes:
* Published as a Supplement to The London Gazette on the 18th September, 1946. Operations in the Eastern Theatre based in India, Mar.- Dec. 1942
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