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VIII. AIR OPERATIONS.
32. During the period under review the R.A.F. continued to expand in numbers and began to receive more modern aeroplanes and equipment. In 1943 it can be said to have passed definitely from the defensive to the offensive. We were still, however, much below our requirements, and our aircraft were deficient in range and performance, and included many obsolete or obsolescent types. The operational strength of the R.A.F. by June 1943 was—
18 Fighter squadrons,
2 Squadrons long-range bombers,
2 Squadrons medium bombers,
11 Squadrons light bombers,
2 Squadrons torpedo bombers,
6 Squadrons Flying-boats,
2 Squadrons Transport aircraft,
2 General Recce. Squadrons,
1 Photographic Recce. Squadron,
1 Coastal Fighter Squadron,
1 Night Fighter Squadron.
The Fighter Squadrons were equipped with Hurricanes and Mohawks; the heavy bombers were Liberators, the medium bombers Wellingtons, and the light bombers Blenheims and Vengeances. The torpedo bombers were Beauforts, the flying-boats Catalinas, and the transport aircraft Hudsons and Dakotas. There were also a few Spitfires and Hurricanes used for photographic reconnaissance. The General Reconnaissance Squadrons were equipped .with Hudsons whilst the Coastal Fighter Squadron and the Night Fighter Squadron were both equipped with Beaufighters.
The strength of the loth American Air Force also increased and by June it had available approximately 60 fighters (Kittyhawks), 50 heavy bombers (Liberators) and 70 medium bombers (Mitchells). Working in close cooperation, the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. together established air superiority over the Japanese air forces operating from Burma.
33. The objects of the Air Force operations during the period under review were: —
(a) To establish and maintain air superiority in Burma;
(b) To support the operations of the Army;
(c) To disrupt enemy communications in Burma;
(d) To defend India against air attack; and
(e) To supply from the air, forces which could hot be supplied by normal means.
The first object was attained by attacks by day and night on enemy-occupied airfields and air installations and bases and by taking every opportunity to engage the enemy in the air.
Direct support of the Army was centred on the Arakan operations where the main fighting took place. The nature of the country, mainly dense jungle, made location of the enemy forward troops usually impossible; and though considerable success was achieved on occasions by bombing on targets indicated by artillery fire or pin-point methods, greater effect was obtained by attack on objectives in the immediate rear of the enemy's forward troops, i.e., sampans and small boats on the waterways, bullock carts and other vehicles on the roads, or the forward movement of troops. These attacks were carried out chiefly by low-flying fighters.
Attacks on communications in Burma were made on railways (marshalling yards, bridges, rolling stock), on road-bridges and transport, on river craft, on depots and similar objectives. In general, the R.A.F. bombers attacked the short-range targets up to 250 miles from our forward airfields, while the Americans with their larger range and bigger armament attacked the more distant objectives. All bombing by U.S. aircraft and by R.A F. light bombers was carried out by day, night bombing being carried out by R.A.F. medium and heavy bombers. Hurricanes with long-range tanks were also used for attacks on transportation.
The defence of India against air attack requires little mention. In December 1942, as recorded in my last despatch,* the enemy made a series of small raids on the Calcutta area. In response to my request for night fighters, a flight of Beaufighters arrived in Calcutta on January 14, 1943. On January 15th three enemy aircraft attempted to raid Calcutta and were all three shot down by a single Beaufighter. Four enemy aircraft made a raid on January igth, of which two were certainly destroyed and one probably. There were no further attacks west of the Brahmaputra.
34. Apart from attacks on India, the enemy air force made occasional raids on our forward airfields and attacks on our troops or bases in Arakan These attacks had little success; and generally the enemy's air activity was surprisingly small. Our constant attacks on his airfields forced him to keep his main air forces outside range of our bomber effort; his practice was to fly in a force of bombers from Thailand or Malaya, carry out one or two raids and then fly back again to distant bases. His bomber raids were always escorted by fighters; these fighters were a match or more than a match for our Hurricanes, unless they could gain an effective height before the approach of the enemy; and it became obvious that re-equipment with Spitfires of at least some of our fighter squadrons was required.
35. Supply dropping was carried out to maintain the 77th Brigade (see paragraphs 24 to 28), also to our forward troops in the Chin Hills and m the extreme north-east of Burma between Fort Hertz and Sumprabum, where our levies were operating. 300 tons of supplies were dropped on 77th Brigade and nearly 1,500 tons on other forces. Operations were over jungle country in difficult conditions, but not a single aircraft was lost.
36. The R A.F. from North-East India also carried out regular sea reconnaissance over the Bay of Bengal, while aircraft from Southern India and Ceylon patrolled convoy routes and shipping lanes.
Photographic reconnaissance was carried out regularly over Burma; while long-range aircraft also made photographic reconnaissance flights over Sumatra, the Nicobar Islands, Andaman Islands and the west coast of Thailand.
Notes:
* Published as a Supplement to The London Gazette on the 18th September, 1946. Operations in the Eastern Theatre based in India, Mar.- Dec. 1942
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